Like Apollo before it, the decision to launch SEI had more to do with non-space policy than with its stated space flight aims. SEI and Apollo were, however, diametrical opposites in most other respects. Apollo occurred at the Cold War's height, while SEI occurred at its end. Apollo aimed at displaying American technological prowess to counter Soviet space successes, while SEI aimed in part to provide new tasks for defense-oriented government agencies and contractors as the Soviet threat receded. Apollo was greeted with public enthusiasm, while SEI was forgotten even as it began. Finally, Apollo accomplished both its political and space flight goals, while SEI accomplished neither.
The concept of a big Apollo-style space initiative was in the air in the late 1980s. In late 1987 and early 1988, the Reagan Administration considered and rejected a "Kennedy-style declaration" calling for a Moon base or a man on Mars. White House staffers explained that they had lacked information adequate to make a "technically and fiscally responsible decision." 3 The White House opted instead for its National Space Policy (February 1988) and for giving NASA's Space Station a name—Freedom (July 1988). More importantly, it requested $100 million in FY 1989 to start NASA's Pathfinder technology development program. The Agency had asked for $120 million. In December 1987, a National Research Council report estimated that NASA would have to spend $1 billion a year on technology development for several years to make up for past neglect. Despite this finding, the funding request was poorly received in Congress—not a propitious sign for big new initiatives. 4
Early in his Administration, President George Bush reestablished the National Space Council and put his Vice President, Dan Quayle, in charge. On 31 May 1989, Bush directed NASA to prepare for a Presidential decision on America's future in space by proposing a space goal with visible milestones achievable early in the 21st century. The directive was said to have originated with OMB director Richard Darman and Quayle's advisors. 5 NASA Administrator Richard Truly, Assistant Administrator for Exploration Franklin Martin, and JSC director Aaron Cohen briefed Quayle in June.
Bush revealed what they had told Quayle and launched the SEI on the steps of the National Air and Space Museum on 20 July 1989, the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon landing. Bush told his audience,
Space is the inescapable challenge . . . . We must commit ourselves to a future where Americans and citizens of all nations will live and work in space . . . . In 1961 it took a crisis—the space race—to speed things up. Today we don't have a crisis. We have an opportunity. To seize this opportunity, I'm not proposing a 10-year plan like Apollo. I'm proposing a long-range, continuing commitment. First, for the coming decade—for the 1990s—Space Station Freedom, our critical next step in all our space endeavors. And next—for the new century—back to the Moon. Back to the future. And this time, back to stay. And then, a journey into tomorrow, a journey to another planet—a manned mission to Mars . . . today I'm asking . . . our able Vice President, Dan Quayle, to lead the National Space Council in determining specifically what's needed . . . . The space council will report back to me as soon as possible with concrete recommendations to chart a new and continuing course to the Moon and Mars and beyond. 6
Aviation Week & Space Technology greeted the initiative with skepticism and a pun, calling it a "space wraith." "President Bush," the magazine reported, "set forth a long-term space plan without a budget and with no more than a skeletal timetable. He then called for more study." 7 The initiative was, moreover, "sprung" on Congress with little "spadework" by either the Administration or by NASA. 8 This helped ensure opposition. Congress sent the Bush White House a clear message by eliminating funds for the Pathfinder technology development program from the FY 1990 NASA budget.
On 26 July, Truly and Martin briefed NASA employees on the President's call. They outlined a "building block approach to progressively more difficult human missions." 9 The proposal, a retread of the 1960s Integrated Program Plan, ignored the less expansive alternative program approach laid out by Sally Ride in 1987. Ride's report was based on conservative projections of NASA's future resources, but the Truly and Martin plan took it for granted that resources for a large, Apollo-style program would automatically follow the President's Kennedyesque proclamation. 10
Truly and Martin laid out the following timetable:
- 1995-2000: Space Station Freedom operational; robotic precursor spacecraft explore the Moon
- 2001-2010: Lunar outpost; robotic precursors explore Mars
- Post-2010: Mars expedition
The Moon and Mars goals would give "direction and focus" to Space Station Freedom, Truly and Martin stated, while the lunar outpost would give American astronauts experience in living and working on another world before confronting Mars' greater demands. The Moon's proximity to Earth ("a three-day trip") and scientific value made it an attractive way station on the road to Mars. For its part, Mars was SEI's ultimate goal because it had "intrigued humans for centuries," was "scientifically exciting" and "the most Earth-like planet," and because it had resources to support human life. Striving for Mars would "cement long-term U.S. leadership in space" by providing a "challenging focus for [the] space program."
Truly and Martin told NASA civil servants that Bush's call was "a major institutional challenge for NASA" that would "require restructure of [the] [A]gency." NASA would seek to add staff and facilities and would streamline its procurement system.
The 90-Day Study
The task of turning NASA's SEI plan into a report for Quayle's National Space Council fell to an internal NASA team led by Aaron Cohen. He had 90 days to complete his study, which started on 4 August 1989. The schedule was said to have been driven in part by Bush's desire to have an SEI implementation plan in hand for his State of the Union speech in early 1990. In September, Truly said that Cohen's study involved 160 managers from across the Agency, of whom 100 were based at JSC. Mark Craig, JSC Lunar-Mars Exploration Program Office manager, headed the JSC study team. 11 On 2 November 1989, Truly passed Cohen's report to President Bush.
Cohen's report contained five "reference approaches" that followed "the President's strategy: First, Space Station Freedom, and next back to the Moon, and then a journey to Mars." There was, of course, nothing new to this approach. In common with the 1969 Space Task Group report, the reference approaches were in fact one approach with multiple timetables for carrying it out, not a range of alternate plans. NASA seemed to be saying that there was only one way to explore the Moon and Mars.
Approach A emphasized "balance and speed." Space Station Freedom assembly would be completed in 1997, two to three years ahead of the completion date planned at the time Cohen's report was released. Astronauts would return to the Moon in 2001 and permanently staff a lunar outpost the following year. By 2010 the outpost would produce 60 tons of oxygen per year. In 2016, four astronauts would travel to Mars in a transfer vehicle using lunar oxygen propellant and would spend 30 days on the surface. The year 2018 would see the first 600-day tour-of-duty in a permanent Mars outpost.
Cohen's Approach B aimed for the "earliest possible landing on Mars." The lunar and Mars activities outlined in Approach A would occur simultaneously, requiring more spending in the 2000-2010 decade. The first Mars expedition would occur in 2011.
Approach C strove for "reduced logistic support from Earth"—that is, increased reliance on ISRU. Lunar oxygen production would thus begin in 2005, earlier than in Approach A.
Approach D was to pick Approach A, B, or C, then slip all dates two to three years to allow Space Station Freedom completion in 1999 or 2000. Americans would return to the Moon in 2004.
Approach E assumed that the U.S. would undertake Bush's initiative, but on a "reduced scale." Freedom would be completed as scheduled in 1999 or 2000, and Americans would return to the Moon in 2004. The lunar outpost would be completed in 2012, and astronauts would spend 30 days on Mars in 2016. A 60-day Mars stay would occur in 2018, followed by a 90-day stay in 2022. The Mars outpost would be activated in 2027.
Cohen's report called for new heavy-lift rockets based on Space Shuttle hardware or on the Pentagon's Advanced Launch System. The largest would place up to 140 metric tons into orbit and have a launch shroud up to 15 meters wide—large enough to cover reusable aerobrake heat shields.
To support the Bush initiative, Space Station Freedom would evolve from lab to spaceport through four configurations. First, the baseline single truss would be expanded to include the vertical lower keel trusses and lower boom truss of the Dual Keel design. The second configuration saw the addition of a lunar spacecraft hangar and a second habitation module to house four-person crews en route to the Moon. The crew roster would rise to 12 in the third configuration to support lunar spacecraft servicing and increased life sciences research and Freedom maintenance. The fourth configuration would see the addition of the Dual Keel upper trusses and installation of a Mars spacecraft assembly facility.
The report called for increased civil service hiring and new budget processes within NASA, but it included no cost estimates. A JSC team led by Humboldt Mandell performed a cost analysis and prepared a cost section, but it was stricken and most copies shredded by Truly's order because the costs arrived at were deemed politically unacceptable. 12 Cost information was leaked from the National Space Council, however, so suppressing the cost data merely stymied informed discussion. 13 SEI's critics seized on the highest leaked cost estimates without consideration of the cushion they contained because they lacked complete information—or, if they had access to the details of the cost estimate, they could safely ignore them because they were not publicly available.
According to Mandell, The 90-Day Study plan "was over-costed by a considerable amount." 14 The stricken cost estimates included a 55 percent reserve—"an allowance incorporating both the cost estimating uncertainties for individual developments (i.e., project-level reserves) and allowances for changes in scope (i.e., program-level reserves)." 15 The initial cost of a permanent Moon base using Approach A and including the 55 percent "cushion" would be $100 billion in constant 1991 dollars between 1991 and 2001. The Mars expedition would cost an additional $158 billion between 1991 and 2016 based on the same stipulations. Thus, achieving the letter of Bush's speech—a return to the Moon to stay and a mission to Mars— would cost a total of $258 billion, of which 55 percent ($141 billion) was cushion. 16
Continuing operations would, of course, add to SEI's cost. In Approach A, operating the lunar base from 2001 to 2025 would cost $208 billion, while operating a Mars outpost from 2017 to 2025 would cost $75 billion. Thus the SEI program cost for Approach A for 34 years, from 1991 to 2025, including operations and a 55 percent cushion, would come to $541 billion. 17
The cost summary had NASA's annual budget climbing from about $13 billion in 1990 to about $35 billion in 2007 for Approach A. At its peak, about half would be allotted to Moon and Mars programs, meaning that the average annual cost for Moon and Mars would be about $15 billion per year. 18
A Quick Study
The 90-Day Study plan was NASA's official proposal for accomplishing SEI, but it was not the only SEI plan put forward by the Agency. In the summer of 1989, an Office of Exploration task force under Ivan Bekey performed a "quick study . . . with analysis support by Martin Marietta" which, it claimed, "defined a much more practical Mars program . . . by virtue of reducing the scale of operations through judicious choices and invention of a new launch vehicle concept." 19 Focused on Mars and relying heavily on Mars ISRU for propellant production, it appears in retrospect as a premonition of piloted Mars planning in the 1990s.