Congress, meanwhile, voiced more reservations. George Miller (Democrat-California), chair of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, did not want "to commit to a specific time period for setting sail to Mars." Miller was not opposed to going to Mars on principle; in fact, he believed it "highly probable that five, perhaps 10 years from now we may decide that it would be in the national interest to begin a carefully planned program extending over several years to send men to Mars." 64
J. W. Fulbright (Democrat-Arkansas), Committee on Foreign Relations chair, sought to put Apollo in proper perspective as an element of 1960s realpolitik: "The [Apollo 11] landing called forth a great deal of poetizing about the human spirit bursting earthly bounds . . . . In all this I perceive not humbug . . . but rather more sententiousness than plain hard truth. Americans went to the Moon for a number of reasons of which, I am convinced, the most important by far was to beat the Russians." 65 Sending American astronauts on to Mars had nothing to do with beating the Russians. Therefore, Fulbright saw little cause to support such a mission.
America’s Next Decades in Space
NASA released its report America's Next Decades in Space: A Report to the Space Task Group on 15 September 1969. 66 Paine was the principal author of the report, which aimed to promote NASA's STG position. In retrospect the report marked the apogee of NASA Mars expedition planning. With a note of pride it pointed out that, in NASA's first decade, the American space program progressed from the 31-pound Explorer 1 in earth orbit to Apollo spacecraft weighing 50 tons sent out to the moon [and] from manned flights of a few thousand miles and 15-minute duration to the 500,000 mile round-trip 8-day [Apollo 11] mission which landed men on the Moon and returned them safely to Earth. 67
The NASA report then appealed to President Nixon to think of his place in history, and to see his decision as an unprecedented opportunity:
At the moment of its greatest triumph, the space program of the United States faces a crucial situation. Decisions made this year will affect the course of space activity for decades to come . . . . This Administration has a unique opportunity to determine the long-term future of the Nation's space progress. We recommended that the United States adopt as a continuing goal the exploration of the solar system . . . . To focus our developments and integrate our programs, we recommend that the United States prepare for manned planetary expeditions in the 1980s. 68
Not surprisingly, the NASA report's program closely resembled the one Paine and von Braun described in their 4 August STG presentation. Continued piloted lunar exploration after Apollo would, the NASA report proclaimed, "expand man's domain to include the Moon" by establishing a lunar base. This would lay groundwork for a piloted Mars expedition in the 1980s. As Mayo had proposed, the NASA report described different program rates, each with a different date for reaching Mars, the ultimate goal of all the programs. The "maximum rate," in which money was no object and only the pace of technology could slow NASA's rush to Mars, scheduled the first Mars expedition for 1981. Program I launched the first expedition in 1983, while Program II, the pacing option favored by Agnew, put it in 1986. Program III was identical to Program II, except that no date was specified for the first Mars expedition.
The STG report proper, The Post-Apollo Space Program: Directions for the Future, was also published on 15 September 1969. It had a split personality. 69 The main body closely followed NASA's America's Next Decades in Space report—not surprisingly, since Paine was again the principal author. The introductory "Conclusions and Recommendations" section, however, differed markedly in tone and emphasis from the NASA-authored section. This was because it was added in early September at the insistence of senior White House staffers who did not want to provide President Nixon with only ambitious objectives from which to choose. 70
The "Conclusions and Recommendations" section acknowledged that NASA had "the demonstrated organizational competence and technology base . . . to carry out a successful program to land man on Mars within 15 years"; however, it failed to advocate an aggressive Mars program, recommending instead sending humans to Mars "before the end of this century." At the same time, it cautioned that "in a balanced program containing other goals and activities, this focus should not assume over-riding priority and cause sacrifice of other important activity in times of severe budget constraints." 71
New space capabilities would be developed in a three-phase program, to which the introductory section attached no firm schedule. Phase 1 would see "exploitation of existing capability and development of new capability, maintaining program balance within available resources." This would include continued "Apollo-type" lunar missions. New development would be based on the principles of "commonality, reusability, and economy." Phase 2 was an "operational phase" using new systems in cislunar space with emphasis on "exploitation of science and applications" aboard space stations. In Phase 3, "manned exploration missions out of Earth-Moon space" would occur, "building upon the experience of the earlier two phases." 72 The "Conclusions and Recommendations" section cautioned,
Schedule and budgetary implications within these three phases are subject to Presidential choice and decision . . . with detailed program elements to be determined in a normal annual budget and program review process. 73
Nixon’s Response
Shortly after the Apollo 11 lunar landing, von Braun told space policy analyst John Logsdon that the legacy of Apollo has spoiled the people at NASA . . . . I believe that there may be too many people in NASA who at the moment are waiting for a miracle, just waiting for another man on a white horse to come and offer us another planet, like President Kennedy. 74
Von Braun might have placed his boss in that category. Paine placed great stock in the effect the NASA section of the STG report would have on President Nixon. Another document—a lengthy memorandum by Mayo dated 25 September 1969—apparently had greater effect, however. Mayo told the President that NASA had requested $4.5 billion for FY 1971 despite a $3.5-billion cap imposed by his office. He then recommended that Nixon "hold an announcement of your space decision until after you have reviewed the [STG] report recommendations specifically in the context of the total 1971 budget problem . . . ." Mayo added that he believed the NASA sections of the STG report "significantly underestimated" the costs of future programs. 75
In late September, Aviation Week & Space Technology reported that NASA was hopeful that it might receive a supplemental appropriation in FY 1970 to begin work toward Mars. 76 In October this optimism led Mueller to establish the Planetary Missions Requirements Group (PMRG), which included representatives from NASA Headquarters and several NASA field centers. The PMRG, the successor to the Planetary JAG, first met formally in December 1969. Its purpose was to blueprint Mars mission concepts in the context of the STG integrated plan. 77
By the time the PMRG met for the first time, however, NASA had received bad news. On 13 November 1969, Mayo's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (formerly the Budget Bureau) had informed Paine that NASA's FY 1971 request would be $1 billion shy of his request—just $3.5 billion. Paine called the figure "unacceptable" and told Mayo that "the proposed rationale" for this budget figure "ignores and runs counter to the conclusions reached by the Space Task Group . . . the OMB staff proposals would force the President to reject the Space Program as an important continuing element of his Administration's total program." 78
Paine was compelled to acquiesce, however. On 13 January 1970, he briefed newsmen on NASA's budget ahead of Nixon's FY 1971 budget speech. He termed the $3.5 billion budget "solid," and announced that the Saturn V rocket production line, already dormant, would close down permanently. 79 This was a serious blow to the nuclear rocket program. It meant that, in addition to having no approved mission, it now had no way to get into space. NASA subsequently began study of using the Earth-orbital Space Shuttle to place NERVA-equipped rocket stages into Earth orbit.
Paine also canceled the planned tenth lunar landing mission, Apollo 20, so that its Saturn V could launch the Skylab space station, and announced that the Viking Mars probe would slip to a 1975 launch with a 1976 Mars landing. In an apparent effort to raise alarm and fend off further cuts, Paine released a list of NASA Center closures in order of priority. First to go would be Ames, in Nixon's California stronghold, and the last three in order would be MSC, Marshall, and KSC. 80
In late January, just before Nixon unveiled his Federal budget for FY 1971, NASA took another cut. When sent to Capitol Hill on 2 February 1970, NASA's portion of the budget had fallen to $3.38 billion. In announcing NASA's budget, Nixon said that "[o]ur actions make it possible to begin plans for a manned mission to Mars." 81 In fact, the 1970-71 period would see NASA's last formal piloted Mars plan until the 1980s.
Nixon did not use his 22 January 1970 State of the Union address to plot the way forward in space as some in NASA had hoped that he might. His first priority, he said, was to "bring an end to the war in Vietnam." He also proposed to "begin to make reparations for the damage we have done to our air, to our land, and to our waters." 82 Apollo 8 pictures of blue Earth rising over the barren Moon had become a rallying point for the environmental movement—not, as Paine had hoped, for space exploration. Paine was unimpressed by Nixon's environmentalist slant. He told an industry group that "[w]e applaud the increase in sewage disposal plants. But we certainly hope this doesn't mean the nation has taken its eyes off the stars and put them in the sewers." 83
Nixon finally issued his policy on the post-Apollo space program on 7 March 1970. Unlike Kennedy's 1961 Moon speech, Nixon's statement was broad and vague, with no specifics about NASA funding. Rather than endorse a specific target date for a piloted Mars mission, he said that "we will eventually send men to explore the planet Mars." The British weekly The Economist reported that people at NASA "looked like children who got the jigsaw puzzle they were expecting rather than the bicycle they were dreaming of." 84
PSAC Recommends Shuttle
At the same time Nixon issued his space policy, his PSAC issued The Next Decade in Space, a report extolling the possibilities of a Space Shuttle-based space program. The presidential advisory body acknowledged that "[e]normous technological capabilities have been built up in the Apollo Program," but recommended "a civilian space effort about half the magnitude of the present level." 85 The PSAC emphasized the military and direct economic benefits of piloted space travel, which it said could only be accrued by replacing virtually all expendable rockets with a reusable Space Transportation System (STS). This would include the Space Shuttle and a reusable orbital tug.
The STS would allow "orbital assembly and ultimately radical reduction in unit cost of space transportation," the PSAC stated, quoting a NASA/Defense Department study that placed the cost per flight of the STS at $5 million, or 1 percent of the Saturn V cost. 86 At the time the PSAC released its report, the U.S. could launch four Saturn V rockets per year, each with a payload of about 100 tons. The PSAC reasoned that "[s]ince only ten flights of the STS can in principle fulfill the role of two Saturn V launches/year, this capability might be reached soon after initial operation of the STS." 87