Entry Control, Not a New Removal Power

Transcript

In a closely watched decision, the D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment against the government’s claim that the Immigration and Nationality Act lets the executive replace statutory removal procedures for people already in the United States. The court said sections eleven hundred eighty two, subsection f, and eleven hundred eighty five, subsection a, paragraph one, deal with controlling entry, not creating a new power to remove people who are already here. It also pointed to the statute’s structure: regular removal proceedings are the sole and exclusive procedure unless Congress says otherwise, and Congress already created one special exception through expedited removal. The court’s history-based reading reinforced the point, because earlier uses of section eleven hundred eighty two, subsection f, had stopped people from entering rather than authorizing extra-statutory expulsions. That mattered here because the case was decided on summary judgment, after final merits rulings, so the court was not just judging whether the government was likely to win. It was squarely deciding that the text, structure, and history of the statute foreclosed the claimed executive authority, especially where bypassing the normal process would affect asylum and withholding protections for people physically present in the United States.